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Investors are more likely to speak about their victories in the market as opposed to their 
defeats, and the listeners of this communication often do not fully discount for the biased 
sample they are presented. Moreover, if the receivers of this communication do not fully 
discount the message, it is possible they will overestimate the value of adopting the 
communicated strategy. Our study tested the presence, strength, and pattern of this bias in 
the transmission process. Participants in the study allocated a set amount of funds across 
different securities and had the opportunity to reallocate over multiple rounds. Different 
information was provided to the participants prior to allocation of the funds in each round. 
Participants received risk and return tradeoff information and transmissions of biased 
samples. We examined how the communications of biased samples affect the investment 
allocations of the participants. A rational economic participant would be expected to 
allocate most funds in the security with the highest risk and return tradeoff and continue to 
hold that allocation in the presence of the communications. We found that participants were 
subject to a transmission bias, causing them to overestimate the value of the biased samples 
and shift allocations to the securities with the highest transmitted returns. We can conclude 
individual investors are subject to a transmission bias in everyday interactions that can lead 
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Introduction to Behavioral Finance 
Behavioral finance is the marriage of finance with the fields of psychology and sociology. 
Behavioral finance attempts to explain market movements and anomalies by loosening the 
assumptions made to justify the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH), which states that all 
asset prices reflect all available information (Hirshleifer, 2014). Therefore, all prices 
should be correct, and it should be impossible to consistently beat the markets over the 
long run (Hirshleifer, 2014). For many years, the Efficient Market Hypothesis was 
considered by many to be the best explanation for how markets work, and many still believe 
that it is. With the work of Daniel Kahneman, Richard Thaler, Amos Tversky, and Robert 
Shiller towards the end of the 20th century, behavioral finance was born. The basic 
implication of the field is that there are irrational aspects of human judgement and behavior 
that have effects at the individual level and in market prices (Hirshleifer, 2014). Most 
recently with the growth of the field, many sub-fields have emerged. One such sub-field 
investigates how cognitive biases effect market participants’ decisions at an individual 




Introduction to this Research 
Psychological biases have major implications for investment performance at the individual 
level. For example, overconfidence helps to explain how aggressive trading at the 
individual level reduces welfare, and why individual investors trade actively despite taking 
losses (Odean, 1998; Barber & Odean, 2000; Hirshleifer, 2014). Much work has been done 
to investigate psychological biases and their effects. Less work, however, has been done to 
investigate the effects of bias in social interaction at the individual level. The approach in 
this research is based on how conversational biases can increase the favorability of a flawed 
approach in personal investing (Shiller, 1995, 2000). The work specifically looks at bias in 
the transmission process, deriving motivation from “Self-Enhancing Transmission Bias 
and Active Investing” (Han & Hirshleifer, 2015). This study aims to investigate the 
underlying “self-enhancing transmission bias” in social interaction and its impact by testing 
the conclusions of Hirshleifer and Han (Han & Hirshleifer, 2015). The transmission bias 
explains that while investors are more likely to speak about their victories in the market as 
opposed to their defeats, the listeners of this communication do not fully discount for the 
biased sample they are presented (Han, Hirshleifer, & Walden, 2018). Moreover, if the 
receivers of this communication do not fully discount the message, it is possible they will 





The main question this research attempts to answer is whether this bias in the transmission 
of a communication can influence investors to act in a less than optimal way. This question 
is investigated using simple portfolio allocation decisions. Study participants are asked to 
allocate a portfolio across four securities in the presence of risk-return tradeoff information. 
This is information a rational investor should use to allocate, by allocating more of the 
portfolio in the securities with the highest return per unit of risk. However, investors are 
also provided with communications of other participants’ realized returns. This 
information should be severely discounted by a rational investor, considering no details are 
provided other than the realized percentage return. No details are provided regarding risk, 
and this is considered a biased sample. If participants behave rationally, they will discount 
the information in the biased sample properly, and portfolios will be allocated using the 
risk-return tradeoff information. If participants are subject to a transmission bias, they will 
not discount the biased sample properly, they will overestimate the value of the 
communicated returns, and portfolios will be allocated using the communicated returns. 
The expectation of the investigator is that participants are subject to a transmission bias. 
By examining the shifts in portfolio allocations, we can conclude whether the sample was 
subject to a transmission bias and make inferences across the population. This investigation 
also examines the relationship between the size of the communicated returns and the shifts 
in portfolio allocations. Specifically, we examine whether higher communicated returns 
for a security increase the likelihood of a higher portfolio allocation in that security. The 





Robert Shiller, a proponent of behavioral finance, once stated, “Investing in speculative 
assets is a social activity” (Shiller, 1989). Indeed, much evidence has been found in recent 
years to support Shiller’s statement. Mutual fund managers communicate with each other, 
and this contributes to herding effects, that result in the managers buying and selling the 
same securities (Hong, Kubik, & Stein, 2005). Research has found that social networks 
play an important role in how information flows into market prices (Cohen, Frazzini, & 
Malloy, 2008). Other work has been done finding that individuals’ investment decisions 
are influenced by coworkers’ investment performance (Lu & Tang, 2015). If a coworker 
experiences a higher equity return, an individual is likely to shift a larger portion of their 
401k into equities and take on more risk (Lu & Tang, 2015). There’s also significant 
evidence that the interaction between individuals greatly influences the decision to begin 
investing in the stock market (Kaustia & Knupfer, 2011; Liu, Meng, You, & Zhao, 2018; 
Hong, Kubik, & Stein, 2004; Brown, Ivković, Smith, & Weisbenner, 2008). 
 
Perhaps most pertinent to the work done in this paper, empirical research has been done 
using data collected from social networks to test the conclusions of Hirshleifer and Han 
(Han & Hirshleifer, 2015). This research found that the likelihood a foreign exchange 




follows the insight that investors are more likely to communicate about their successes in 
the market (Heimer & Simon, 2013). The research also found evidence to support the 
popularity of active investing. It found that traders were more likely to adopt an active 
strategy if they had received communications from other traders about the success of such 
strategies (Heimer & Simon, 2013).  
 
The literature makes it clear that social interaction influences investor behavior and social 
biases effect individuals’ investment decisions and outcomes. This study hopes to add the 






The study was administered through the use of online survey software. Participants were 
provided with instructions prior to beginning the study. Participants were asked to invest 
10,000 across 4 securities in an initial allocation and in two reallocations, referred to as 
Round 0, Round 1, and Round 2. Risk-return tradeoff information for the 4 securities was 
provided to the participants in Round 0, 1, and 2. The instructions also stated, “this is a 
simulated exercise, please note all four securities represent real S&P 500 stocks, and the 
performance of your decisions will be tracked and analyzed, but your responses will be 
anonymous.” It was explicitly stated to participants that “as a rational economic participant, 
you like return and dislike risk.”, and to “assume the provided risk and return tradeoff 
information is the long-run constant for each security”. Additional information was 
provided to participants before both Round 1 and Round 2. 
 
Participants were provided with long-term risk-return tradeoff information for 4 securities. 
Security A, B, C, and D had the best to worst risk-return tradeoff information as can be 
seen in Figure 1 below. This is the information provided to participants, along with an 
explanation stating, “Below is information on the securities you may invest in, based on 




sees on average from a security, per unit of the security’s risk/volatility. The higher the 
ratio, the more return is received relative to risk”. 
 
Figure 1: Risk-return tradeoff information 
 
The study was separated into two groups, a treatment and a control. In both groups, 
participants are provided with transmissions in Round 1 and Round 2. These transmissions 
take the form of a communication of another participants’ return. It is stated to the 
participants that a participant in a previous edition of the study received a particular return 
pattern for each security. The returns for each are provided. This information is synthesized 
and it represents a biased sample through which we test for transmission bias. In the 
presence of this information, participants are asked to reallocate their portfolios in both 
Round 1 and 2. 
 
In the treatment group, the returns provided in the communications in both Round 1 and 2 
were the highest for Security D, followed by B, C, and A in order. The Security with the 
worst long-term risk-return tradeoff, Security D, had the largest return as transmitted to the 




worst return as transmitted to the participant. See Figure 2 below for the full list of returns 
provided to the participants in the treatment group in Round 1 and 2. 
 
Figure 2: Treatment Round 1 (left) and Round 2 (right) communicated return 
 
In the control group, the returns provided in the communications in both Round 1 and 2 
were the highest for Security A, followed by B, C, and D in order. The Security with the 
worst long-term risk-return tradeoff, Security D, had the worst return as transmitted to the 
participant. The Security with the best long-term risk-return tradeoff, Security A, had the 
best return as transmitted to the participant. See Figure 3 below for the full list of returns 
provided to the participants in the control group in Round 1 and 2. 
 





The study was completed online using the survey tool, Qualtrics. The study sampled from 
two different populations. The study was administered in the Marketing Research Lab 
(Lab) in the Fisher College of Business and using the Amazon Mechanical Turk (MT). 
Participants in the Lab were students enrolled at the college with the average age of 20 
years old. The MT is a cloud sourcing platform and participants can be anyone, anywhere. 
The Lab gave 105 observations, each one student. The MT gave 288 observations, each 






In the first round of allocation, participants followed the rational expected allocation order 
as seen in Figure 4 below. They placed most their allocation in Security A, followed by B, 
C, and D in order. This was expected and required for the results in subsequent rounds to 
be functional in looking at the bias. 
 
 
Figure 4: Treatment Round 0 results 
  
In the second round, participants had the opportunity to reallocate their portfolio. 
Participants were provided new information, taking the form of a transmission of another 
participant’s return in a “previous running of this study”. The returns provided to the 
participants were the largest for Security D, followed by B, C, and A in order. The Security 
with the worst long-term risk-return tradeoff, Security D, had the largest return as 
Summary'Table'Round'0
Security'A Security'B Security'C Security'D
Average'Allocation 4363.13 2352.94 1966.44 1317.49
Average'%'Allocation 43.63% 23.53% 19.66% 13.17%
Average'Rank 1 2 3 4
Provided'Sharpe'Ratio 2.11 0.79 0.54 @0.65




transmitted to the participant. The Security with the best long-term risk-return tradeoff, 
Security A, had the worst return as transmitted to the participant. A rational economic 
participant unaffected by transmission bias would discount this message, and we would 
expect to see little to no change in portfolio allocation.  
 
What we have observed, as expected by the investigators, is a large shift in portfolio 
allocation towards Security D. After Round 1 Security D was, on average, the largest 
portion of the participants’ portfolios. See Figure 5 below for the full results following 
Round 1. 
 
Figure 5: Treatment Round 1 results 
 
In the final round, participants again had the opportunity to reallocate their portfolio. 
Participants were provided with new information. Mirroring the returns communicated in 
Round 1, returns provided to the participants were the largest for Security D, followed by 
B, C, and A in order. 
 
What we have observed, as expected by the investigators, is a continued shift towards a 
portfolio allocated according to the communicated returns. Security A, despite having the 
Summary'Table'Round'1
Security'A Security'B Security'C Security'D
Average'Allocation 2568.31 2417.12 1482.54 3532.03
Average'%'Allocation 25.68% 24.17% 14.83% 35.32%
Average'Rank 2 3 4 1
Communicated'Return ?14.24% ?2.63% ?10.13% 7.40%




dominate long-term risk-return tradeoff, is now only the 3rd largest allocated security. See 
Figure 6 below for the full results following Round 2. 
 
Figure 6: Treatment Round 2 results 
 
We found that portfolio allocations did shift according to transmitted returns, which is what 
was expected by the investigators. By the end of Round 2, the allocations had not 
completely shifted to the order of the transmitted returns. Security A was the 3rd largest 
allocation as opposed to 4th, and Security C was 4th as opposed to 3rd. However, allocation 
in Security A was trending downward. Interestingly, allocation in Security D retreated 
slightly in Round 2, despite the affirmation of a dominant transmitted return.  
 
See Figure 7, 8, and 9 below for a summary of the cross-section of allocations and the 
change in allocations from round to round. 
Summary'Table'Round'2
Security'A Security'B Security'C Security'D
Average'Allocation 2289.12 2831.80 1495.75 3383.33
Average'%'Allocation 22.89% 28.32% 14.96% 33.83%
Average'Rank 3 2 4 1
Communicated'Return @5.49% 12.19% @5.03% 19.03%





Figure 7: Treatment summary table 
 
 
Figure 8: Treatment change in allocations 
 
 
Figure 9: Treatment summary chart 
Summary'Table
Security'A Security'B Security'C Security'D
Average'Allocation'Round'0 43.63% 23.53% 19.66% 13.17%
Average'Rank 1 2 3 4
Communicated'Sharpe'Ratio'Round'0 2.11 0.79 0.54 B0.65
Communication'Rank 1 2 3 4
Average'Allocation'Round'1 25.68% 24.17% 14.83% 35.32%
Average'Rank 2 3 4 1
Communicated'Return'Round'1 B14.24% B2.63% B10.13% 7.40%
Communication'Rank 4 2 3 1
Average'Allocation'Round'2 22.89% 28.32% 14.96% 33.83%
Average'Rank 3 2 4 1
Communicated'Return'Round'2 B5.49% 12.19% B5.03% 19.03%











Security)A Security)B Security)C Security)D
Round)0
Round)1 417.95% 0.64% 44.84% 22.15%




















The control group received returns that corresponded to the risk-return tradeoff of each 
security. Security A, B, C, and D had the best to worst risk-return tradeoff information in 
order, and similarly had the best to worst returns provided to the participant. In other words, 
participants had no catalyst to deviate from the rational ranking of the portfolio allocations. 
As expected from the control group, Security A made up most of the portfolio, followed 
by B, C, and D in order. See Figure 10 below for a summary of the results from the control 
group. 
 
Figure 10: Control summary table 
 
Treatment and Control Comparison 
Participants’ allocations deviated from the optimal rational allocations when subject to the 
treatment transmissions. These transmissions communicated higher returns for the 
rationally inferior security, Security D, and lower returns for the rationally superior 
security, Security A. When subject to the control transmissions, participants’ allocations 
Summary'Table
Security'A Security'B Security'C Security'D
Average'Allocation'Round'0 45.99% 24.22% 18.93% 10.85%
Average'Rank 1 2 3 4
Communicated'Sharpe'Ratio'Round'0 2.11 0.79 0.54 B0.65
Communication'Rank 1 2 3 4
Average'Allocation'Round'1 62.16% 25.80% 7.07% 4.96%
Average'Rank 1 2 3 4
Communicated'Return'Round'1 8.93% 5.14% B0.77% B1.20%
Communication'Rank 1 2 3 4
Average'Allocation'Round'2 60.58% 29.86% 5.57% 4.00%
Average'Rank 1 2 3 4
Communicated'Return'Round'2 4.32% 2.17% B1.90% B8.41%













reflected the optimal rational allocations through each round. These transmissions 
communicated higher returns for the rationally superior security, Security A, and lower 
returns for the rationally inferior security, Security D. See Figure 11 below for a depiction 
of the differences between the allocations in Security A and D between the two groups. 
 
Figure 11: Treatment Security A and D vs Control Security A and D 
 
The differences between the allocations of the control group and those of the treatment 
were found to be statistically significant for Security A, C, and D in rounds 1 and 2 as 
shown in Figure 12 below. We would expect the differences to be significant for Security 
A and D in Round 1 and 2, because in those rounds transmissions are sent giving major 
deviations in return. In the control group, the transmissions sent in Round 1 and 2 
correspond to the initial risk-return tradeoff information. The transmissions give Security 
A the highest returns and Security D the lowest returns. In contrast, the transmissions sent 















returns to Security A. Additionally, the returns transmitted in Rounds 1 and 2 for Security 
B and C were second and third highest, respectively, for both the treatment and control 
groups. Therefore, it wouldn’t be expected to see a significant difference between the 
control and treatment for either Security B or C. 
 
Figure 12: T-test treatment vs control 
 
Allocations and Transmitted Returns 
 
While only 12 observations, we did find that the portfolio allocations were increasing in 
sender return. In other words, the higher the transmitted return, the higher the allocation in 
that security. We also found the trend to be slightly convex. Both were expectations of the 
investigators. See Figure 13 below. Due mostly to the small number of observations, the 
results were not significant at the 0.05 level. However, the results were significant at the 
0.10 level, which is of note considering only 12 observations. As can be seen in the 
regression output in Figure 14, a regression gave a p-value of 0.08. The regression output 
also provides an R-squared statistic of 0.27, giving that only 27 percent of the variance in 
allocation is explained by the transmitted return. Another depiction of the results can be 
seen in the line fit plot in Figure 15, which shows above average predictability. The results 
show that there is a positive relationship present. As the return in the transmissions 
t"test%results%(two%tail%p"value)
Security)A Security)B Security)C Security)D
Round)0 0.44871 0.66529 0.65435 0.23642
Round)1 0.00000 0.60355 0.00000 0.00000




increase, portfolio allocations towards those respective securities increase. Statistical 
significance at the 0.05 level may be achieved with an increase in observations. 
 
Figure 13: Allocations and transmitted returns chart 
 
 























df SS MS F Significance)F
Regression 1 0.025133292 0.02513329 3.74130915 0.081857109
Residual 10 0.067177802 0.00671778
Total 11 0.092311094
Coefficients Standard)Error t)Stat P5value Lower)95% Upper)95% Lower)95.0% Upper)95.0%
Intercept 0.2483218 0.023676313 10.4881958 1.0252EI06 0.195567691 0.30107592 0.19556769 0.30107592





Figure 15: Allocations and transmitted returns line-fit plot 
 
While only 8 observations, we also found that the change in portfolio allocations from 
round to round were increasing based on the change in sender return. For example, if the 
transmitted return changed dramatically from round to round, it was likely that the portfolio 
allocations would also change dramatically. See Figure 16 below. The results were not 
significant at the 0.05 level, but were significant at the 0.10 level. A clear positive 
relationship exists. The full regression results can be seen in Figure 17. Again, statistical 





















Figure 16: Change in allocations and transmitted returns 
 
 
























df SS MS F Significance)F
Regression 1 0.03351816 0.03351816 3.80581884 0.098942191
Residual 6 0.052842494 0.00880708
Total 7 0.086360654
Coefficients Standard)Error t)Stat P5value Lower)95% Upper)95% Lower)95.0% Upper)95.0%
Intercept I0.0138558 0.033931257 I0.4083502 0.69719003 I0.096882629 0.06917096 I0.0968826 0.06917096





Marketing Research Lab and Amazon Mechanical Turk 
The study was run through the Marketing Lab at the Ohio State University Fisher College 
Business (Lab) and online through the Amazon Mechanical Turk (MT). We have found 
differences in the portfolio allocations of each population as shown in Figure 18. In Round 
1 we see the MT participants kept Security A as the 2nd largest allocation in the portfolio, 
while the Lab participants had Security A as the 3rd largest allocation in the portfolio. The 
MT participants seemed to be more reluctant to shift the allocations away from the security 
with the dominant risk-return tradeoff. The differences are significant at the 0.05 level as 
can be seen in Figure 19. 
 
Figure 18: Mechanical Turk vs Lab summary 
 
Summary'Table
Security'A Security'B Security'C Security'D
Mechanical)Turk)Allocation)Round)0 42.56% 22.41% 20.30% 14.73%
MT)Rank 1 2 3 4
Lab)Allocation)Round)0 48.58% 28.74% 16.72% 5.96%
Lab)Rank 1 2 3 4
Sender&Rank&Round&0 1 2 3 4
Mechanical)Turk)Allocation)Round)1 27.33% 23.05% 15.54% 34.07%
MT)Rank 2 3 4 1
Lab)Allocation)Round)1 18.14% 29.27% 11.57% 41.02%
Lab)Rank 3 2 4 1
Sender&Rank&Round&1 4 2 3 1
Mechanical)Turk)Allocation)Round)2 24.26% 26.92% 16.22% 32.59%
MT)Rank 3 2 4 1
Lab)Allocation)Round)2 16.51% 34.81% 9.07% 39.62%
Lab)Rank 3 2 4 1














Figure 19: T-test Mechanical Turk vs Lab 
Security)A Round)1 Security)B Round)1
Variable(1 Variable(2 Variable(1 Variable(2
Mean 0.18141509 0.26890244 Mean 0.29273585 0.22678862
Variance 0.03465998 0.05309287 Variance 0.04877554 0.02777801
Observations 53 246 Observations 53 246
Pooled=Variance 0.04986556 Pooled=Variance 0.03145435
Hypothesized=Mean=Difference 0 Hypothesized=Mean=Difference 0
df 297 df 297
t=Stat F2.5871092 t=Stat 2.45542186
P(T<=t))one7tail 0.00507688 P(T<=t))one7tail 0.00732244
t=Critical=oneFtail 1.6500003 t=Critical=oneFtail 1.6500003
P(T<=t))two7tail 0.01015377 P(T<=t))two7tail 0.01464489





In Round 0, participants allocated their portfolios according to the provided long-run risk-
return tradeoff information. This information was also provided in the following two 
rounds. If participants were not subject to a transmission bias, only this risk-return 
information should’ve been used to allocate, not the communications of biased samples. 
However, participants’ portfolio allocations did shift in favor of the securities with the 
highest transmitted returns, which is not what would’ve been expected of a rational 
economic participant. We can conclude individual investors are subject to a transmission 
bias in everyday interactions, as predicted by the investigators and as theorized by Han and 
Hirshleifer (Han & Hirshleifer, 2015). Implications of this are most easily observable at 
the individual level. If individuals overestimate the value of converting to the transmitted 
strategies, they’re likely to make suboptimal, irrational investment decisions that will cost 
them in lower returns. For example, members of investment clubs often communicate 
about their strategies in the markets and these same members select securities with high 
beta values, are frequently active investors, and underperform the benchmark (Barber & 
Odean, 2000; Barber, Heath, & Odean, 2003). Testing the aggregate effects of the 
transmission bias on the financial markets is incredibly difficult and not much work has 
been done to investigate how it may be possible. One approach using publicly available 




the aggregate, however, it remains to be seen how individual biases in social interaction 
could be measured in the aggregate (Liu, Meng, You, & Zhao, 2018).  
 
While it was not found to be statistically significant at the 0.05 level, as a security’s 
transmitted returns increased so did the security’s position in the portfolio. In other words, 
the higher the returns communicated in the biased sample, the more likely participants were 
to convert to the communicated strategy. This reflects behavior that is the opposite of 
rational. It also has dangerous implications for individual investors, who are known to 
communicate often, speak more about their winners than their losers, and overstate their 
returns (Shiller, 1989; Han & Hirshleifer, 2015; Han, Hirshleifer, & Walden, 2018). 
Further work should increase the numbers of observations, allowing for a more conclusive 
decision on the significance of this relationship. 
 
There were differences in allocations between the two sampled populations using Amazon 
Mechanical Turk (MT) and the Marketing Research Lab (Lab). The biggest difference is 
in Round 1 between Securities A and B. The participants from the MT were reluctant to 
allocate less of the portfolio in Security A, which had the dominant risk-return tradeoff. It 
follows that the bias may have been less prevalent among this group that acted more 
rationally. This is likely to be attributed to the differences among the demographics of the 
two groups. We can infer that MT’s participants have a higher average age, more life 
experience, and possibly more experience in the markets than the Lab’s student participants 




difference in the allocations and the strength of the bias in the two samples. This is an area 
of consideration for future research. 
 
There are many opportunities for improvement on this research as well as follow up work 
that can be conducted. One improvement on the current research would be increasing the 
number of observations. With a deeper data set, the significance of some of the results can 
be more accurately stated. In addition, demographic factors that were largely not examined 
in this research could be more closely investigated. For example, we draw a general 
conclusion that the Mechanical Turk population acted more rationally and we infer that 
this is due to a higher average age. More data could allow for a more conclusive 
relationship among age and the effects of the transmission bias. An opportunity for 
increasing observations could be through collecting data from real interactions of investors 
on social media platforms which can be seen in Facebook Finance: How Social Interaction 
Propagates Active Investing (Heimer & Simon, 2013). One such social media platform is 
Matador, a self-proclaimed mobile investing application that allows are users to view buys, 
sells, and realized returns of anyone in the community (Tap X Trading & Analytics, Inc., 
2019). In any follow-up study, another area of improvement will be performance 
incentives. If a follow-up study focuses on data from a social platform, the incentives are 
the participants’ actual unrealized and realized returns with his or her own capital. If a 
follow-up study takes place in a controlled laboratory setting or via survey, utilizing 
performance incentives, such as a cash award for best performance, should work to enhance 





As can be seen with the work in this paper, others’ work preceding this paper and their 
work in progress, social interactions can have major implications in investors’ decisions 
and therefore the outcomes of their investments. With continued work on individual level 
biases like the one investigated in this paper, the hope is to better understand why investors 
make the decisions they do. Furthermore, the goal is to learn about the forces causing 
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